List of some errata in book
                 Games and Decision Making 
                by Aliprantis & Chakrabarti

page 30. (a) If u'(w^*) = 0 in the interior of an
   interval with u"(w) > 0, then the maximum is at one of the end points.  
   Thus a risk seeking utility tends to pick end points.  
   (b) If u"(w) < 0, then the maximum is at w^*. Thus a risk averse person,
   tends to pick a blend of choices. 

page 55:  The condition is that A > c_1 + c_2 then we know the two
   firms can find a Nash equilibrium (in example 2.10).  The region is
   between the lines q^*_1 = 0 and q^*_2=0, 
   c_2 = 2c_1 - A, and c_2 = A/2 + c_1/2.

pages 80-3 Section 3.2:  Backward induction works whenever there is 
   "no cycles".  Of course it has to be correctly understood how to proceed
   when the graph is not a tree.  Maybe some comment like this could be made.

page 125, Ex 4a:  This problem is wrong since 60-m > 40.  
   Perhaps you mean monitor rather than "don't monitor".  
   4b.  This should probably be h rather than F.  

page 125, line 7: If 72 + L >= H, then 0 <= w_2^* <= (91-H)/8 ...

page 133:  Beliefs are used to determine the expected payout from an
   information set. This is the reason we need to introduce the idea of
   beliefs.

page 142:  There is some confusion in example 5.6 whether the node is N or
   E.  I think E should be replaced by N on the last two lines of page 142.

p 147 Step III: The factor of 1/2 should be dropped.

p 191 Defn:  The d_i should be identified as the disagreement values.  

p207 Monotonicity:  It should be s in s(B_T) and s' in s(B) rather
   than T and S.

p 208 Figure 7.8: (1,4) is not the Nash point: (2,2.67) is.  

p 212 Example 7.12:  D^* =0 and Profit = R - LW^*

p 220 Figure 7.14:  The dotted line should be inside the shaded
   area to illustrate the concept.  

p 227 n!:  I think some dots were left out of the definition of n!

p 242 line 22:  Player's payoff here is larger than (delta_1 x) which is
   larger than (delta_1^2 x), as ...

p 247 lines 6 & 8:  x_h should have a delta_h in the numerator and x_l
   should have a delta_l since theorem 7.30 has a delta_2 in the numerator.
   This means that many inequalities have to be rewritten on pages 247-9.
   In particular, the first case of the theorem should be 
   s^* =1 - delta_el(1-delta_1 x_el) if 
   p_h delta_1^2 x_h + (1-p_h)(1 - x_el) > x_h.